Appendix Table 1 reports descriptive characteristics by Medicaid status. A discussion of these results is provided in the main text.
Appendix Table 2 provides coefficient estimates for key explanatory variables included in our regression analysis. These results correspond with the triple difference analysis shown in Table 4 in the main paper. These estimates suggest that younger age, Hispanic ethnicity, unmarried status, male sex, higher educational attainment, and US citizenship are associated with a higher likelihood of employment. Among the employed, younger age, Hispanic ethnicity, married status, male sex, and having less education are associated with greater hours worked.
Older age, married status, male sex, higher educational attainment, and US citizenship are associated with higher hourly wages and a higher mean log occupation wage.
Appendix Table 3 provides results by age and marital status and extends the subgroup analysis shown in Table 4 in the main paper. The results of these tables are described in the main text.
Appendix Tables 4 and 5 presents the results from occupation specific triple difference models of intensive margin effects and occupation switching. Appendix Table 6 presents results for the commute time variables observed in the American Community Survey. Results and methods for all three tables are described in the main text.
Appendix Table 7 presents an additional set of specification and robustness checks. The first two rows describe results from our main model when using alternative CPS weights produced by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center and distributed by IPUMS-CPS (Zeingenfuss & Davern, 2009 ). These alternative weights correct for the fact that there are sudden jumps in population counts when the Census Bureau switches over to a new Decennial population base. They also correct for imputation errors by excluding full-supplement imputations and re-weighting the remaining sample back to population controls. Full supplement imputations occur when a monthly CPS respondent refuses to participate in the ASEC and their entire supplement response is imputed. We come to the same conclusions when using these alternative weights or when excluding weights altogether.
Appendix Table 7 also presents results from our preferred model when we only include states that adopted a benefit change. Identification in this model comes only from treatment timing. Results from that model are similar to results presented in the main text. We also show that we come to similar conclusions when replacing the lagged vision indicator in our main model with a concurrent indicator. Though estimates are somewhat attenuated. Table 7 presents the results of our parametric test of differential pre-existing trends. As described in the main text, this test is complicated by the fact that a single state may have multiple vision benefit changes over the study period. To capture the largest number of states that ultimately changed their vision coverage policies before any change, we restricted our analysis period to 2001 -2007 (CPS years 2002 -2008 . Eight states changed their coverage policies for the first time during or after 2008, including: California, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington. 1 States that changed their coverage policies prior to 2008 were excluded from the sample for this analysis. We estimated the following regression:
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1 Three of these states changed their policies in 2011, and therefore do not contribute to identification in our DDD analysis that uses lagged vision coverage policies. We repeated the same analysis excluding these three states (ID, NC, and WA) with very similar results. We chose to include all eight states since the larger sample size may increase the chance of detecting significant differences in outcome trends.
Where Changer is an indicator equal to one for the eight states that eventually changed their vision coverage policies during our study period and zero otherwise, year is a linear yearly trend, and all other variables are as defined in the main text. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between being a changer state, Medicaid status, and the linear yearly trend is of interest. We also estimated analogous models with no within-state control group (i.e., Medicaid beneficiaries only).
Appendix Table 7 presents the results of this analysis, both for the Medicaid sample only and including the within-state control group. We did not detect a significant difference in trends for most of the outcomes we studied, with the exception of the log hourly wage for which trends differed at the five percent level regardless of whether we included the within-state control group. Taken together, we do not find strong evidence that our identifying assumption is violated in either the parametric tests presented here or in the event study models presented in the main paper. 
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